









	The physical realm is causally closed, according to physicalists like me. But why is it causally closed, what explains causal closure? In what follows I argue that reductive physicalists are committed to embracing one explanation of causal closure to the exclusion of all others, and that as a result they must give up on using a causal argument to attack mind-body dualism. Dualism is objectionable, reductive physicalists can hold, but it is not objectionable in any distinctively causal way.
1. 	Potential Explanations of Causal Closure
Following Jaegwon Kim, the causal closure thesis can be formulated as follows.
(Closure): If a physical event has a cause at time t, it has a physical cause at t.​[1]​

Events here can be understood as fine-grained Kimian events, the exemplifications of properties by particulars.​[2]​ Our question then is what explains (Closure)’s truth. This is meant as a metaphysical question, not an epistemological one. I am not asking what our evidence is for believing (Closure), although we will address this topic below. On the conception of explanation I am assuming, facts or events or other worldly entities metaphysically determine, and thereby explain, other facts or events or other worldly entities. Construing facts as true propositions, I am asking what the metaphysical explanation is for why the (Closure)-fact obtains.
	Causation is one kind of metaphysical determination relation, and so causal explanation is one species of metaphysical explanation. There are other kinds of metaphysical determination relations as well though: realization, supervenience, constitution, composition, grounding, and so on. Accordingly, there are non-causal forms of metaphysical explanation. What I am seeking is the non-causal metaphysical explanation of (Closure)’s truth—the fact in virtue of which (Closure) obtains.
	Consider the physicalist slogan that “everything is physical,” or, restricting our attention just to events (the relata of causal relations), consider the following thesis.
	(P*): Every event is physical.
(P*)’s truth provides one potential explanation of (Closure)’s truth. If every event is physical, then of course it will be the case that whenever a physical event has a cause, that cause will be physical. Consider an analogy. Let a non-unicorn event be any event whose constitutive object is not a unicorn. Since there are no unicorns, it follows that all actual events are non-unicorn events. Now consider the following thesis, intended as a rough analog to (Closure).
(U-Closure): If an event has a cause at time t, it has a non-unicorn cause at t.
(U-Closure) is true. Why is it true? Because there are no unicorns, and so all events are non-unicorn events. That is the explanation. The proposal we are considering says that the explanation of (Closure)’s truth is perfectly parallel to this.
	This is not the only conceivable explanation of (Closure)’s truth, however. Maybe instead the physical realm is causally closed because there is something about physical events—something almost like a shield surrounding them—that prevents impingements from the nonphysical realm, or at least that permits such impingements only when a physical cause is also taking place. One way to develop this thought is by appealing to laws of nature. Maybe (Closure) is true because it is a law.​[3]​ In putting things this way, I assume laws explain their instances: (Closure)’s lawhood would explain its mere truth. Alternatively one might say that if (Closure) is a law, it is explanatorily basic and so its truth has no explanation. This isn’t how I will put things, but I have no deep objection to doing so. What matters is that we keep track of the difference between this second proposal and the first, where (Closure)’s truth is explained by (P*)’s.
	Yet further explanations seem imaginable as well, but for our purposes we can stop at these two. Replace the second explanation just offered with any third you please and all the arguments about to be offered should still go through.
2.	 The Explanatory Commitment of Reductive Physicalism
	Call those philosophers who accept (P*) reductive physicalists. This is meant to match standard usage, at least approximately. So for instance, type identity theorists, the paradigmatic reductionists, count as reductive physicalists in the present sense. Not all physicalists accept (P*) however. There are nonreductive physicalists who maintain that mental events are not themselves physical events, but rather are realized by physical events.​[4]​ We will mostly set them aside in what follows. I believe the argument to be presented can be generalized to apply to them as well, and thus that no physicalist (reductive or nonreductive) can regard dualism as causally objectionable. However, establishing this would involve us in complications that would distract from the case I most want to make here. I will be content to show that reductive physicalists cannot regard dualism as causally objectionable.
	By stipulation, then, reductive physicalists take (P*) to be true. But as we saw in the previous section, (P*)’s truth would explain (Closure)’s truth. Thus, reductive physicalists find themselves committed to a certain explanation of (Closure)’s truth. I claim that given this commitment, reductive physicalists are precluded from accepting any additional, independent explanation of (Closure)’s truth. The remainder of the present section is devoted to unpacking what this claim means. In the next section, I provide my argument supporting it.
	Imagine God is building a world, and the one thing he wants to guarantee about the place is that (Closure) is true there. He has some options. First, he could declare that no nonphysical events are to take place in his world—(P*) is to be true there. (P*) entails (Closure), and so this divine act by itself would guarantee (Closure)’s truth. Second, God could declare that (Closure) is to be a law at his world. Lawhood entails truth, and so again, this divine act by itself would guarantee (Closure)’s truth. Third, God could do both these things. He could declare that (Closure) is to be a law and, in addition, declare that (P*) is to be true. In that case, there would be a sense in which God had overdetermined (Closure)’s truth. He would have done more work than is strictly necessary to achieve the goal of ensuring (Closure)’s truth. When I say that reductive physicalists are precluded from accepting any explanation of (Closure)’s truth that is independent of (P*)’s truth, it is because I believe there is something objectionable about taking (Closure)’s truth to be overdetermined in this way.
	My description of the God-scenario requires some qualification. Let’s understand the notion of independent explanation as follows: (i) if P explains R,​[5]​ and (ii) Q explains R, these explanations are independent just in case neither (iii) P explains Q, nor (iv) Q explains P, nor (v) there is some S that explains both P and Q. Suppose that in building his world, God declares that (P*) is to be not just true but also a law. And suppose in addition that the laws are closed under deductive entailment, as some philosophers hold. It will then be the case both that (P*) is true and also that (Closure) is a law—a kind of derived law, which qualifies as a law only because (P*) is a law and (P*) entails (Closure). In that case, we might want to say that (Closure)’s truth is explained both by (P*)’s truth and also by (Closure)’s lawhood. Fine—I have no problem with this. These explanation are not independent, since both (P*)’s truth and (Closure)’s lawhood are explained by (P*)’s lawhood. Consequently, I have no objection to a reductive physicalist who holds that this is how things are. My claim is only that reductive physicalists are precluded from accepting any explanation of (Closure)’s truth that is independent from that provided by (P*)’s truth.
	But we might also conceive of a different kind of (Closure)-law, a law that holds independently of (P*). To envision such a law, begin by considering a world where (Closure) is a law but (P*) is false. At that world, (Closure)’s lawhood must be independent of (P*)’s truth, since (P*) is not true at all. Next, consider a world containing a (Closure)-law of precisely this independent sort, but where in addition (P*) is also a law. At this world, (P*) and (Closure) are both laws, but it’s not the case that (Closure) is a law only because (P*) is, this is not the full explanation of why (Closure) qualifies as a law at this world, since by assumption the exact same sort of (Closure)-law holds in the first world we considered, where (P*) is false. Reductive physicalists cannot regard (Closure) as an independent law of this sort, if the claim I am presently unpacking and soon will be defending is correct.
	My thought here can be further clarified by appealing to counterfactuals, which will play an absolutely central role in the argument that follows. Consider a principle of the form: if P explains R, then (barring overdetermination, preemptions, and so on) if P had not obtained, R would not have obtained. Some such principle is widely accepted in the special case of causal explanation, but here I intended it as a principle governing metaphysical explanation generally.​[6]​ Now take the following counterfactual.
	(CF): ~(P*) > ~(Closure).
In English: if there had been some nonphysical events, the physical realm would not have been causally closed. Is (CF) true? It depends on what explains (Closure).
	If the only reason the physical realm is causally closed is that there are no nonphysical events—or, at least, if there is no explanation independent of this one—it follows, given my proposed principle, that if, counterfactually, there had been nonphysical events, the physical realm would not have been causally closed. Again, the unicorn analogy is helpful here. Consider the following analog to (CF).
(U-CF): Unicorns exist > ~(U-Closure).
In English: if unicorns had existed, it would not have been the case that whenever an event has a cause, it has a non-unicorn cause.
I take (U-CF) to be an obvious, uncontroversial truth. If there had been unicorns, they would not have been epiphenomenal danglers or entirely causally redundant (causing only effects that also have sufficient non-unicorn causes). Maybe there are possible worlds containing epiphenomenal or causally redundant unicorns, but such worlds are comparatively far away. At the more nearby worlds containing unicorns, the unicorns violate (U-Closure) all over the place by non-redundantly causing various effects. They non-redundantly cause hoofprints in the snow, visual sensations as of unicorns, unicorn droppings in the forest, and so on. After all, (U-Closure) is true here in the actual world only because there are no unicorns, and so if, counterfactually, there had been unicorns, (U-Closure) would not be true. A philosopher who takes the explanation of (Closure)’s truth to mirror the explanation of (U-Closure)’s truth should hold that (CF) is true just as (U-CF) is.
Suppose then that both (P*) and (Closure) are laws. Still, we can ask whether or not (CF) is true. If (Closure)’s lawhood is independent of (P*)’s, (CF) figures to be false. After all, laws generally support counterfactuals, and so the closest ~(P*)-worlds figure to be places where this independent (Closure)-law holds just as it does in the actual world, in which case (Closure) will be true at these nearby worlds, and so (CF) will be false. On the other hand, if (Closure)’s lawhood is entirely derivative on (P*)’s, if it qualifies as a law only because (P*) does, (CF) figures to be true: if ~(P*) had obtained then (P*) would not have been a law (lawhood requires truth), in which case (Closure) would not have been a law (since by assumption its lawhood depends entirely on (P*)’s lawhood), in which case there would be nothing to prevent the nonphysical events at these closest ~(P*) worlds from violating (Closure).
	Summarizing then, the claim I will be defending in the following section is that reductive physicalists are precluded from accepting any explanation of (Closure)’s truth that is independent from that provided by (P*)’s truth. They can take (Closure) to be a kind of derivative law of nature, but not a law that holds independently of (P*). Furthermore, given the connection between explanation and counterfactuals, my claim entails that reductive physicalists are precluded from taking (CF) to be false. They cannot hold that the physical realm would have been causally closed even if, counterfactually, there had been nonphysical events.
3.	The Problem with Both Causal and Non-causal Overdetermination
I now turn to defending this claim. As noted above, a God who guarantees (Closure)’s truth by both declaring that (P*) is to be true and also declaring that (Closure) is to be an independent law of nature has, in a sense, overdetermined (Closure)’s truth. This is not causal overdetermination; (Closure)’s lawhood does not cause its truth, for instance. Rather, it is a matter of there being two completely separate facts, each of which by itself guarantees (Closure)’s truth. Each of which by itself sufficiently explains (Closure)’s truth.
Call this metaphysical explanatory overdetermination. Causation is one type of explanatory metaphysical determination relation, and so causal overdetermination is a species of metaphysical explanatory overdetermination. Again, though, there are also various non-causal explanatory metaphysical determination relations: realization, supervenience, constitution, composition, grounding, and so on. Wherever there is explanatory metaphysical determination, there is the potential for overdetermination, or at least for a view entailing such overdetermination. The problem with reductive physicalists who take (Closure) to be an independent law of nature—or for that matter, who accept any explanation of (Closure)’s truth that is independent of (P*)’s truth—is that they are guilty of positing a kind of non-causal metaphysical explanatory overdetermination. I claim that this is objectionable in exactly the same way that views that posit systematic causal overdetermination are objectionable.
My idea here is heavily influenced by Kim’s most recent presentations of his causal exclusion argument against nonreductive physicalism.​[7]​ Kim argues that there is a prima facie tension between holding that a mental state M both supervenes on a physical state P and is caused by some distinct mental state M’.​[8]​ Given that supervenience and causation are both metaphysical determination relations, Kim writes, M thereby seems overdetermined. There are two explanations for why it obtains: (i) because it supervenes on P and P obtains, and (ii) because it is caused by M’. Of course, this is not causal overdetermination (or at least not purely causal overdetermination), given that supervenience is not a causal relation. Rather, it is a matter of there being two separate facts, each of which explains M. The way to resolve this tension, Kim suggests, is to suppose that M’ causes P, for in that case M’ and P do not provide independent explanations of M.​[9]​ For our purposes, the key point is that a non-causal metaphysical determination relation like supervenience can give rise to a potentially troublesome kind of overdetermination just as much as causation can.
	To further bring out the parallels between causal and non-causal explanatory overdetermination, consider the following causal argument for reductive physicalism, which will be our focus in the remainder of the paper. 
(P1): If a physical event has a cause at a time t, it has a physical cause at t.
	(P2): All mental events have physical effects.
	(P3): The physical effects of mental causes are not all causally overdetermined.
(C): Mental events are identical with physical events.​[10]​
I note in passing that the first premise is (Closure) while the conclusion I will be treating as equivalent to our (P*).​[11]​ For now, though, focus on the anti-overdetermination premise (P3). Why accept it? The issue is controversial, but here is one attempt at an answer.
	In my view, the problem with mind-body theories that reject (P3) is not that such causal overdetermination is metaphysically impossible. I am willing to suppose there are bizarre worlds out there where (P3) is false, just as I suppose there are bizarre worlds where everyone who dies is killed by a pair of simultaneous gunshots to the heart. Instead, I take the problem with rejecting (P3) to be epistemic, in a way. It is extremely difficult to see what evidence could reasonably convince us that we actually live in a world where (P3) is false. To bring out the difficulty, imagine we already possess fully sufficient causal explanations for all physical effects in terms of purely physical causes.  What warrant could we then obtain for positing additional nonphysical causes of those same physical effects? Doing so inevitably would seem gratuitous; it would bring no gain in explanatory power.
	The exact same dynamic arises in the case of non-causal metaphysical overdetermination we are considering. Taking (Closure)’s truth to be non-causally metaphysically overdetermined is objectionable, but not because such overdetermination is metaphysically impossible. I am willing to suppose there are worlds where it is both the case that (P*) is true and also the case that (Closure) is an independent law of nature. The trouble is imagining what evidence could reasonably convince us that we actually live in such a world. To mirror the discussion of the causal case, suppose we know that (P*) is true and are wondering whether (Closure) is an independent law of nature. What evidence should we look for? Clearly, it will not do to go out and observe various causal chains that all comply with (Closure), while never finding a single chain that violates it. Such observed compliance would fail to generate any abductive pressure on us to infer (Closure)’s lawhood since we already possess a fully sufficient explanation for such compliance: the truth of (P*). Given our presumed knowledge that (P*) is true, we know in advance that all observed causal chains will comply with (Closure) regardless of whether or not it is an independent law. But in that case, observed compliance could do nothing to confirm (Closure)’s independent lawhood.
	Admittedly, in this scenario there also will not be any disconfirming evidence in the form of causal chains violating (Closure). There cannot be any such violating chains, given (P*)’s truth. There is an asymmetry between lawhood and non-lawhood, however. For familiar reasons of parsimony, a theory should posit as few explainers as it needs to get by. An independent (Closure)-law would be an explainer, and so there is an initial presumption against such a law that can be overridden only when a gain in explanatory power is to be had. Given (P*)’s truth, however, all the explanatory work that an independent (Closure)-law might hope to do is already done, leaving such a law explanatorily idle. In this way, (P*)’s truth explanatorily excludes (Closure)’s independent lawhood, we might say, mapping Kim’s language (his talk of “causal exclusion”) onto our own discussion.
	At least this is my own preferred analysis of the problem with positing metaphysical explanatory overdetermination, both causal and non-causal.​[12]​ For the sake of the arguments that follow, it is not strictly required that you accept this analysis. It is good enough if you agree that there is a deep parallel between causal and non-causal forms of metaphysical determination, so that non-causal overdetermination is problematic in much the way that causal overdetermination is, whatever way that happens to be. If you deny this parallel, your fight is as much with Kim as it is with me.
	What if you think that metaphysical explanatory overdetermination in all its forms is unproblematic?​[13]​ Then even prior to my objections in this paper, you should reject the causal argument for reductive physicalism, given its anti-overdetermination premise (P3). Think of it as a dilemma for proponents of the causal argument. Either positing metaphysical explanatory overdetermination is objectionable or it is not. If not, the causal argument should be rejected because of its premise (P3). If so, the causal argument should be rejected because—as I now turn to argue in the remainder of the paper—it covertly requires the non-causal metaphysical explanatory overdetermination of (Closure)’s truth. Either way, then, the causal argument should be rejected.
4.	The Causal Argument Against the Kansas City Royals
	Focusing on the second horn of this dilemma, I will assume in what follows that metaphysical explanatory overdetermination is something to avoid positing, and consequently that no reductive physicalist can accept any explanation of (Closure)’s truth that is independent of (P*)’s truth. The rest of the paper is devoted to arguing that this result, although it does not undermine the case for reductive physicalism itself—a point to which we shall return—is fatal for the causal argument for reductive physicalism. My argument for this claim proceeds in two parts. In this section I target what I regard as the intuitive idea driving the causal argument. In the sections that follow I go beyond this intuitive assessment and diagnose a specific epistemic flaw with the causal argument.
	Starting with the intuitive point, philosophers often treat physical causal closure as a deep truth about the world. In fact, though, true causal closure theses are abundant. You get one whenever you have a nonexistent. We have seen this in connection with unicorns, but here let’s vary examples. The Kansas City Royals baseball team did not win the 2003 World Series, and so the 2003 Champion Royals do not exist. This entails,
(KC-Closure) If an event has a cause at time t, it has a non-Champion Royal cause at t.​[14]​

We can feed this causal closure thesis into a causal argument against the Royals.
(P1): (KC-Closure).
	(P2): The 2003 World Series Champions are not epiphenomenal.
	(P3): The 2003 World Series Champions are not causally redundant.
(C): The Kansas City Royals did not win the 2003 World Series.
The analogy to the causal argument for reductive physicalism is obvious. Each argument consists of a causal closure premise, an anti-epiphenomenalism premise, and an anti-overdeterminationism premise. The causal argument for reductive physicalism purports to establish something about the nature of mental events, namely that they are not nonphysical. The causal argument against the Royals purports to establish something about the 2003 World Series winners, namely that they are not the Royals.
The causal argument against the Royals is sound: each premise is true and the conclusion deductively follows. Indeed, its soundness is far less controversial than that of the causal argument for reductive physicalism. After all, there really are epiphenomenalists and overdeterminationists about mental events, but not about the 2003 World Series winners. Still, the causal argument against the Royals is absurd. The hypothesis that the Royals won the 2003 World Series is false, but it is not objectionable in any distinctively causal way. In the next section I diagnose exactly what is wrong with the argument; here, I just want to draw out why it seems absurd.
We take a step in the right direction by reflecting on counterfactuals. Yes, the 2003 Champion Royals fail to non-redundantly cause anything. But that is only because they don’t exist! If, counterfactually, the Royals had won the 2003 World Series, they would have non-redundantly caused all sorts of effects, and (KC-Closure) would have been violated many times over. The following analog to (CF) is clearly true.
	(KC-CF): The Royals won the 2003 World Series > ~(KC-Closure).
Maybe there are possible worlds where the Royals win the 2003 World Series despite being epiphenomenal danglers or being entirely causally redundant, but those worlds are very far away.​[15]​ At the more nearby worlds where the 2003 Royals win it all, they violate (KC-Closure).
	What I take the truth of (KC-CF) to show is that the problem that the 2003 Champion Royals really suffer from is not distinctively causal. Rather, it is a much more general existence problem—namely, the 2003 Champion Royals do not exist. If only they existed, there would be no lingering causal obstacle for them to overcome. But then, absolutely everything is such that it would not enter into causal relations if it did not exist.​[16]​ Unless we want to trivialize what it is for a hypothesis to count as causally problematic, we should reserve this label just for those hypotheses positing entities that would be epiphenomenal or causally redundant even if they existed. Perhaps mathematical platonism is causally problematic in this sense, but surely the hypothesis that the Royals won the 2003 World Series is not. And this, I suggest, is why nobody tries to run a causal argument against the 2003 Champion Royals, the truth of (KC-Closure) and the soundness of the causal argument against them notwithstanding.
	The truth of (KC-CF), which again I think shows that the Royals have a general existence problem rather than a distinctively causal one, follows from what explains (KC-Closure)’s truth. (KC-Closure) is true only because the 2003 Champion Royals do not exist, and so if, counterfactually, they did exist, (KC-Closure) would not be true. Taking the case as illustrative, I propose that a nonexistent fails to qualify as distinctively causally problematic whenever its corresponding causal closure thesis is true only because the entity in question does not exist. Consider unicorns, or the milk in the fridge (which I finished yesterday), or the Mitt Romney presidency. In each case there is a true causal closure thesis corresponding to these nonexistents, and so a sound causal argument to be made against them. Still, none of these entities is distinctively causally problematic since in each case the given causal closure thesis is true only because of the nonexistence of the entities in question.
	You may be tempted to respond here that nonexistence is a kind of causal problem, and so there is a sense in which these nonexistents are causally problematic after all. Fine, say this if you wish. But then appreciate that nonexistents have various other parallel problems having nothing to do with causation. The nonexistence of the 2003 Champion Royals entails not just (KC-Closure) but also (KC-Time): Everything that begins to exist is not a member of the 2003 Champion Royals; and (KC-Identity): Everything that is self identical is not a member of the 2003 Champion Royals; and so on. The 2003 Champion Royals have a causal problem only in the same attenuated sense that they have a temporal problem (uncontroversial premise: the 2003 World Series Champions began to exist at some point), a self identity problem (uncontroversial premise: the 2003 World Series Champions are self identical), and so on. The Royals’ problem is not distinctively causal.
	The exact same is true of the nonphysical mental events that dualists posit. What they have is a general existence problem, not a distinctively causal one. Or at least, this is what you must hold if you are a reductive physicalist who accepts (P*). For if you accept (P*), you cannot accept any additional, independent explanation of (Closure)’s truth, and so you cannot reject (CF). That is, if you are a reductive physicalist, you cannot deny that if, counterfactually, there were nonphysical mental events, then the physical realm would not be causally closed. 
	But in that case, nonphysical mental events are causally no different than the 2003 World Champion Royals or unicorns or the milk in the fridge or the Romney presidency. Again, if you want to say this is a kind of causal problem for dualists, go ahead. But then appreciate that dualism has a causal problem only in the same attenuated sense that it has a temporal problem (every event that has a beginning is physical), a self identity problem (every event that is self identical is physical) and myriad other non-causal problems as well. Dualism’s problem is not distinctively causal. Or at least, so reductive physicalists must hold.
	I take this result to undermine the thought behind the causal argument. Here is David Papineau offering a characteristic expression of that thought.
If conscious properties were non-material, they would thus be epiphenomenal ‘danglers’, caused by physical occurrences but themselves having no effects on physical activities . . . if there were compelling independent grounds for holding that conscious properties are non-material, then we would have no option but to accept epiphenomenalism about consciousness.​[17]​

Right: something like this is supposed to be dualists’ causal problem (although Papineau could have mentioned causal overdeterminationism in addition to epiphenomenalism). The trouble is that Papineau is guilty of overdeterminationist thinking in this passage. Papineau accepts (P*), which by itself guarantees physical causal closure.​[18]​ But in addition, he covertly assumes in this passage that there is some further, unspecified, overdetermining reason the physical realm is causally closed, a reason that would hold even under the counterfactual supposition that conscious properties were non-material. Those who reject overdeterminationist thinking in all its guises must reject what Papineau says here. Just as nobody holds that the 2003 World Series Champions would be epiphenomenal danglers had the Royals won, no reductive physicalist should hold that conscious properties would be epiphenomenal danglers if they were non-material.
	Metaphysically, what would suit Papineau is if (Closure) were a law of nature that held independently of the truth of (P*). In that case, the physical realm really would be causally closed even if conscious properties were non-material, and so the instantiations of such properties really would be excluded from non-redundantly causing any physical effects. And in that case, dualism really would have a distinctively causal problem while hypotheses positing various other nonexistents, like the 2003 Champion Royals, would not. Unfortunately for Papineau, reductive physicalists cannot hold that there is such an independent (Closure)-law, however, on pain of positing the explanatory overdetermination of (Closure)’s truth. Reductive physicalists thus cannot take dualism to be distinctively causally problematic in the way Papineau does.
	Here is one last way to capture the idea defended in this section. Suppose I am a reductive physicalist. I hold that all events are physical, and (consequently) that the physical realm is causally closed. Now, I reject mind-body dualism, but I concede that if dualism were true, nonphysical mental events would have not the slightest trouble causing physical effects, and doing so non-redundantly. I say that dualism is false, but I also say that if it were true, we would not need to revise our pre-theoretic views about mental causation whatsoever. By my lights, then dualism is not the slightest bit causally objectionable. My claim in this section is that all reductive physicalists should endorse the views just set out.
5.	Warrant Transmission and Cogency
	To further develop my argument at this point, it will be helpful to draw on recent epistemological work on the transmission of warrant.​[19]​ To know a conclusion on the basis of a particular argument, your belief in the argument’s premises must be warranted, and your warrant for those premises must not essentially depend on prior warrant for the conclusion itself—if it does so depend, the basis of your knowledge of the conclusion will be the source of that prior warrant rather than the argument in question. Following Crispin Wright, let’s say that arguments not meeting these conditions are not cogent.​[20]​ With this framework in place, I claim that although the causal argument for reductive physicalism may be sound—I am willing to grant that it is—it is not cogent.
	To get a feel for what this charge amounts to, reconsider the causal argument against the Royals. Again, the argument is undeniably sound. Still, I suggest it is defective in that the only warrant we have for its (KC-Closure) premise essentially depends on antecedent warrant for its conclusion. Roughly: we know (KC-Closure) is true only because we first know that the Royals did not win the 2003 World Series. In addition, I claim that the causal argument for reductive physicalism is uncogent in the very same way. Roughly: we know that the physical realm is causally closed only because we first know the truth of physicalism.
	Discussions of warrant transmission often focus on arguments alleged to be question begging, like Moore’s proof of the external world. And in connection, critics of causal arguments for physicalism sometimes complain that such arguments beg the question, covertly assuming physicalism from the outset. But that is not my complaint. Arguments can fail to be cogent without any question getting begged.​[21]​ Imagine I am advancing the causal argument against the Royals, and in order to support its (KC-Closure) premise, I provide videotape evidence of the 2003 World Series showing that the Royals did not win (they did not even participate). This evidence really does warrant belief in (KC-Closure), and it does so without begging any question. Even if you initially doubted (KC-Closure), or doubted that the 2003 Champions were not the Royals, the video evidence should overcome your doubts. Still, the resulting causal argument against the Royals is defective in that anyone possessing this warrant for its (KC-Closure) premise is already warranted to believe its conclusion even without running through the argument. If you have the video proof, you no longer need the causal argument.
I claim that reductive physicalists should regard the causal argument for their view similarly: there is compelling evidence in favor of (Closure), but it is all evidence that supports (Closure) by first supporting (P*), which entails (Closure). In making this suggestion, I note that uncogency is a very general problem for causal arguments. Again, for any nonexistent there is a corresponding true causal closure thesis that can be fed into a sound causal argument against the existence of the entity in question. So then, why aren’t causal arguments much more common, why aren’t they deployed all over the place? Because they are almost never cogent. Generally, there is no realistic way of knowing the truth of a given causal closure thesis short of first knowing that the corresponding entity does not exist. Given that this is the general state of things, it is unsurprising that the causal argument for physicalism should fail to be cogent as well.
6.	The Inductive Case for Causal Closure
	To rebut my charge of uncogency, what defenders of the causal argument for reductive physicalism need is some warrant for (Closure) that does not depend on prior warrant for (P*). In principle, an a priori defense could be mounted,​[22]​ but this option attracts few contemporary physicalists and would drain the case for physicalism of any serious empirical content.​[23]​ For many physicalists, myself included, the leading attraction of physicalism is its supposed empirical superiority to dualism, and so I will assume that what is sought is an empirical warrant for (Closure).
	Here is Andrew Melnyk, making exactly the sort of case needed.
[It is not true] that in order to be persuaded of the causal closure of the physical one must already be persuaded of physicalism. To see this, it is necessary only to review how the closure principle is usually evidenced. First we become persuaded, on the basis of observational evidence and ordinary canons of scientific reasoning, that various physical effects have sufficient physical causes, since the best available explanations of those effects posit physical and only physical causes; surely no assumption of physicalism is needed to take the first step. Then, employing enumerative induction, we treat these well-supported explanations as evidence that all physical effects have sufficient physical causes.​[24]​

I really do think that causal argument proponents need something like this inductive defense. Sometimes philosophers try to capture dualism’s alleged causal problem by imagining taking some physical effect putatively caused by a mental state, like crying putatively caused by pain, and tracing back the causal chain leading up to the effect, finding physical causes each step of the way. This is perfectly fine as a way of picturing things, but don’t mistake it for a line of argument distinct from Melnyk’s inductive case. We can just as easily imagine tracing the causal chain back and finding that nonphysical ectoplasm occupies the pain causal role. Why favor one act of the imagination over the other? Because, a defender of the causal argument should say, there is an impressive inductive case for (Closure) provided by physics or neuroscience or other empirical fields. I thus will make the inductive defense of (Closure) my focus in what follows.
In response to Melnyk, I claim that no reductive physicalist can accept this inductive case, because no reductive physicalist can hold that (Closure) is susceptible to inductive confirmation. In broad outline, my thought is that there are close connections between inductive confirmation, counterfactuals, and explanation. Because of these connections, accepting an inductive case for a hypothesis inevitably involves taking on certain commitments regarding counterfactuals, which in turn involves taking on certain explanatory commitments. In the case of interest, accepting an inductive case for (Closure) commits you to holding that (Closure)’s truth has some explanation independent of (P*)’s truth. But as we have seen, no reductive physicalist can embrace this explanatory commitment. Consequently, no reductive physicalist can accept Melnyk’s inductive case.
	To flesh out this line of thought, we begin by considering the widely recognized link between induction and counterfactuals.​[25]​ Why is there such a link? Plausibly, it is because unobserved actual instances of a hypothesis are relevantly like nearby counterfactual instances, and so evidence E inductively warrants the belief that hypothesis H is actually true—has no unobserved actual counterinstances—only if E also warrants the belief that H is true in nearby counterfactual worlds—has no nearby counterfactual counterinstances. Inductive confirmation is incapable of limiting itself just to the actual world; inevitably, it spills over to nearby worlds.
	Because of this, accepting an inductive case for a hypothesis commits you to not accepting a certain range of counterfactuals involving the hypothesis.​[26]​ Suppose I observe that various bits of copper conduct electricity. This evidence inductively warrants me to believe that all copper is conductive, we can suppose, but only given that I do not accept certain counterfactuals about my samples (and about copper more generally). My samples could have been slightly warmer, and no doubt there are some actual pieces of copper that are slightly warmer than my samples. In light of this, when accepting the inductive case I had better not accept the counterfactual that if my samples had been warmer, they wouldn’t have been conductive. After all, if this counterfactual is true of my samples, why think that those actual pieces of copper that are warmer than my samples are conductive?​[27]​
	Similarly, accepting an inductive case for (Closure) brings with it a commitment to not accepting certain counterfactuals involving (Closure). If you accept those counterfactuals, you are no longer entitled to accept the inductive case. Now, if the inductive evidence is to warrant your belief in (Closure) independently of any prior warrant for (P*), as it must to rebut the charge of uncogency, you must not accept the counterfactual ~(P*) > ~(Closure)—that is, you must not accept (CF). For, consider: could a defender of the inductive case for (Closure) simultaneously grant that if there were nonphysical events they would violate causal closure, and also at the same time insist that thanks to induction we know that causal closure obtains regardless of whether or not there are such nonphysical events? Surely this is incoherent. If it is agreed that nonphysical events would violate (Closure) if they existed, how on earth could induction inform us that (Closure) is true while leaving it open that there may be such events?
	This incoherence can be avoided by rejecting (CF), holding instead that the physical realm would be causally closed even if there were nonphysical events. In that case it becomes much more understandable how induction could tell us that (Closure) is true while leaving (P*) as an open question. But this is not a move that any reductive physicalist can make. For—turning back now to the connection between explanation and counterfactuals—reductive physicalists must hold that (Closure) is true simply because (P*) is, they cannot posit any independent explanation if they are to avoid metaphysical explanatory overdetermination. But in that case they cannot reject (CF), they cannot deny that if there were nonphysical events, the physical realm would not be causally closed. It follows that reductive physicalists cannot accept the inductive case for (Closure). They cannot do so because the inductive case brings with it certain explanatory commitments that they are prevented from undertaking.
	Reductive physicalists who originally arrived at their view on the basis of the causal argument taken in conjunction with the inductive case for (Closure) are now obligated to go back and reject that inductive case, since it is at odds with their rejection of explanatory metaphysical overdetermination (they must reject overdetermination, given their acceptance of the (P3) premise of the causal argument). But then, unless they possess some other warrant for their view, their reductive physicalism is now unwarranted.
This is a strong conclusion. I have two additional arguments to support it. The first is offensive: it aims to place a burden on those who would resist this section’s objection to the inductive case for (Closure). The second is defensive: it aims to show that my objection to the inductive case does not bear as severe a burden as it might initially seem. I present these additional arguments in turn.
7.	The Inductive Case for (KC-Closure)
	Reconsider the causal argument against the Royals. What is to stop its (imaginary) defenders from establishing its cogency by advancing a Melnyk-style inductive case for (KC-Closure)? Not a shortage of positive instances: everywhere you look, you will find events with non-Champion Royals causes. Not the existence of counterinstances: there are none. If there is an objection to be made against such an inductive case, it seems it must be that (KC-Closure) is not susceptible to inductive confirmation. But why not?
	Again, I suggest it is because accepting such an inductive case would commit you to not accepting the counterfactual that if the Royals had won the 2003 World Series, (KC-Closure) would have been violated—that is, to not accepting (KC-CF). But, for good reason, everybody does accept this counterfactual. (KC-CF) is very obviously true: it is crazy to think that the Royals might have been epiphenomenal or causally redundant if they had won. But then, since everybody accepts (KC-CF), it follows that nobody can accept the inductive case for (KC-Closure).
	If you reject my objection to the inductive case for (Closure) as it was set out in the previous section, I say that you are obligated to show that your line of resistance would not equally support an inductive case for (KC-Closure). Otherwise, you will be saddled with the absurd view that nothing is defective about the causal argument against the Royals, since there is no readily apparent criticism to make of the argument aside from uncogency. Furthermore, I see no way to fulfill this obligation that does not involve (at least covertly) positing some sort of explanatory difference between (Closure) and (KC-Closure).
For instance, you could propose that (Closure) is a law of nature while (KC-Closure) is not, and argue that this is why the former but not the latter is inductively confirmable. Provided you take (Closure) to be an independent law, you could satisfy the counterfactual commitments that I have argued go along with embracing an inductive case for (Closure). Yet again, then, we see that positing an independent (Closure)-law suits the proponents of the causal argument for reductive physicalism extremely well—so well that we might almost think of it as an implicit assumption of the argument. The trouble, as we have seen, is that no reductive physicalist can take (Closure) to be such a law, on pain of positing the explanatory overdetermination of (Closure)’s truth.​[28]​
	Summarizing, you can think of this section’s argument as follows. Along with many other philosophers, I propose that there is a close connection between explanation and confirmation. I also hold that (KC-Closure) is not inductively confirmable, a claim that I regard as overwhelmingly plausible. If you hold that (Closure) is inductively confirmable, then you must hold either that (Closure) has a different sort of explanation than (KC-Closure) does—and no reductive physicalist can accept this, on pain of positing explanatory overdetermination—or else you must somehow sever the connection between explanation and confirmation, drawing an inductive distinction between hypotheses that is not grounded in any relevant explanatory difference. I doubt this can be done, but at any rate the burden is on you to show how.
8.	An Alternative: The Abductive Case for Physicalism
	In this concluding section, I offer an alternative argument for reductive physicalism. My proposed alternative is similar enough to the causal argument that it is easy to conflate the two, and in fact I suspect that much of the reason the causal argument has attracted so much philosophical attention is because it has been confused with this other, better argument. 
We begin developing the alternative argument by considering the following question: if dualism were true, what evidence should we expect to find of its truth? Well, I suggest that one thing we should expect to find is physical effects that are causally unexplainable in terms of physical causes. In suggesting this, I take for granted that mental events are non-redundant causes of physical effects; I regard this as something close to a Moorean fact. In other words, then, I assume the conjunction of (P2) and (P3) from the causal argument.
	When we go out and look, however, we do not find this evidence predicted by dualism. Admittedly, our knowledge of the world’s causal structure is limited, and it is limited even when we restrict our attention to causal chains taking place within the body, the obvious place to look for impingements by a nonphysical mind. But surely it is significant that those causal chains that we do know of consist entirely of physical effects with physical causes, without even a single clear exception to this pattern.
	Melnyk takes these causal chains of physical events to warrant (Closure) inductively and directly—that is, without warranting (P*) first. My counterproposal is that the very same causal chains warrant (P*) abductively and directly. That is, (P*)’s truth best explains why the various causal chains we know of consist entirely of physical events. Only at this point, having already inferred (P*), do we then go on to deduce (Closure). I admit then that the evidence cited does warrant belief in (Closure). But it does so only indirectly, by first warranting (P*). It’s like the videotape evidence of the 2003 World Series: the videotape warrants belief in (KC-Closure), but only by first warranting the belief that the Royals did not win the title. Every argument advanced in this paper, including even the objection to the inductive case for (Closure), is consistent with this sort of abductive argument.​[29]​ Indeed, the abductive argument is tailor-made for the case I have been making, given that the whole point of the abductive argument is to explain positive instances of (Closure), together with the absence of counterinstances, by appealing to (P*)’s truth.
One might suspect at this point that the abductive argument for reductive physicalism is just a trivial variant on the causal argument. Not at all. Their different warrant structures mean that the abductive argument cannot play the role the causal argument is expected to play. This can be brought out by considering familiar armchair defenses of dualism, like David Chalmers’ zombie argument or Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument.​[30]​ Defenders of the causal argument sometimes concede that these dualist defenses have some prima facie pull, while insisting that they ultimately must fail. After all, the line goes, given the compelling evidence for (Closure), if these dualist defenses were successful they would force us into an intolerable epiphenomenalism or overdeterminationism.​[31]​ Recall Papineau: “if there were compelling independent grounds for holding that conscious properties were non-material, then we would have no option but to accept epiphenomenalism about consciousness.”
	By the lights of the abductive argument, things stand completely differently. The warrant it provides for (Closure) depends entirely on the warrant it first provides for (P*), and so any epistemic defeater of (P*) is thereby an undercutting defeater of (Closure). That is, according to the abductive argument, our reason for believing that the physical realm is causally closed is just our prior warranted belief that every event is physical, and so if we were to learn that there exist nonphysical events of the sort envisioned by Chalmers and Jackson, we would be left without a reason to believe in causal closure. To mimic Papineau’s formulation: if there were compelling grounds for holding that conscious properties were non-material, these grounds would undermine our reasons for accepting causal closure, and so there would be no reason to avoid interactionist dualism.
	Epiphenomenalism is sometimes regarded as the most empirically respectable form of dualism.​[32]​ By the lights of the abductive argument, however, it is simply ad hoc maneuvering intended to save a theory that made a prediction that didn’t pan out. Dualism predicts a result that we don’t find, and epiphenomenalism provides one way to save dualism from this embarrassment. Compare: belief in unicorns is empirically disreputable. You don’t make the belief any more reputable by adding that the unicorns are epiphenomenal and that this is why there are no known violations of (U-Closure).
	Of course, no armchair defense of dualism could tell us exactly where (Closure) is violated. That would take empirical investigation. But such a defense could create a reasonable expectation that (Closure) is violated somewhere. For a rough analogy, imagine God comes to us tomorrow and tells us he has created unicorns, but without telling us anything of their causal status.​[33]​ This by itself would defeat whatever prior warrant we had for believing (U-Closure).
	The abductive argument for reductive physicalism need not be weaker than the causal argument in any interesting sense. After all, the case against unicorns is pretty much airtight even though there is no cogent causal argument to be made against them. But also, the abductive argument has advantages over the causal argument. It does not require the sort of explanatory overdetermination of (Closure)’s truth that I have argued the causal argument requires. In addition, the abductive argument uses a pattern of reasoning that is ubiquitous in scientific and everyday thought, unlike the causal argument which uses a pattern of reasoning found almost nowhere else—nowhere else do we infer a causal closure thesis as an intermediate conclusion. 
Surely, it is relevant to the case against unicorns that we know of no effects requiring unicorn causes: no unicorn hoofprints in the snow, no visual sensations as of unicorns (at least none that cannot be otherwise explained), no unicorn droppings in the forest, and so on. But just as surely, it’s not that we take this evidence to support (U-Closure) directly, and then build from there to the conclusion there are no unicorns. Rather, the evidence directly and abductively supports the conclusion that there are no unicorns. At that point, if we infer (U-Closure) at all, it is only as an afterthought.
	As a final thought, I want to acknowledge a certain attraction of the causal argument. It promises a kind of victory even in defeat. By the lights of the causal argument, if dualism were proven true it would be a truth we would very much regret, for it would rob us of our mental causation. For the reasons set out in this paper, I believe reductive physicalists should reject this suggestion. They should be content with aspiring for victory in victory. That is, they should concede that nothing catastrophic for mental causation would follow if mind-body dualism were true, while at the same time insisting that it is not true—reductive physicalism is true.
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^1	  Kim (2005: 15).
^2	  Kim (1973), (1976).
^3	  I assume here that a universal generalization like (Closure) is the sort of thing that could be a law.  But everything I say could be made compatible with alternative conceptions of laws, like the Tooley/Dretske/Armstrong view on which laws are relations among universals.
^4	  See for instance Yablo (1992), Pereboom (2002), and Shoemaker (2007). Some nonreductive physicalists, like Fodor (1974), have held that although mental and physical properties are distinct, mental and physical events are identical. On the Kimian conception of events we are assuming, however, if mental and physical properties are distinct, it follows that mental and physical events must be distinct.
^5	  The variables here range over true propositions, or facts. However, a similar notion of independent explanation could be formulated in terms of events.
^6	  Lowe (2009) explores the prospects and limitations of using such counterfactuals to analyze ontological dependence, a non-causal but explanatory metaphysical determination relation. I do not mean to defend such an analysis here, I only mean to suggest that there is a close connection between metaphysical explanation and counterfactuals, just as there is a close connection between causation and counterfactuals even if the counterfactual analysis of causation fails.
^7	  Kim (2005: 39-40).
^8	  Here, following Kim, the variables range over events.
^9	  However, this leads to the familiar causal exclusion problem since P, being a physical state, has fully sufficient physical causes. Or so Kim argues.
^10	  This version is taken from Papineau (2002) with minor adjustments. Besides Papineau, proponents of some sort of causal argument for physicalism (either reductive or nonreductive) include Smart (1959), Lewis (1966), Davidson (1970), Tye (1995) and (2009), Levine (2001), and Melnyk (2003).  It is the single most influential argument for physicalism today.
^11	  (C) says that all mental events are physical, while (P*) says that absolutely all events are physical.  These claims are equivalent if we assume the via negativa approach, which defines “the physical” as the non-mental.  Even if we do not assume this, treating (C) and (P*) as equivalent is harmless since proponents typically take the causal argument to generalize to all events.
^12	  My analysis entails that explanatory overdetermination in general is problematic just when there are not independent sources of evidence for the different explainers. If a pair of simultaneous gunshots to the heart leave separate entrance wounds, this need not be an objectionable case of overdetermination—there is separate evidence for the efficacy of each shot. This is very different from the sort of overdetermination at issue in (P3), since mental and physical causes do not leave separate traces. Compare Kim (2005: 48) on this very point.
^13	  See for instance Crisp and Warfield (2001), Sider (2003), and Schaffer (2003), who defend causal overdetermination.
^14	  A non-Champion Royal event is one whose constitutive object is not a member of the 2003 World Series Champion Kansas City Royals. All actual events are thus non-Champion Royal events.
^15	  In fact, I do think it is a logical possibility that the Royals could win the 2003 World Series while being epiphenomenal or causally redundant. An epiphenomenal Royals team could win all its games by virtue of the opposing team always forfeiting, for example, which plausibly requires the opponents to cause some effects (e.g., perhaps they announce their forfeiture to the umpires) but not the victorious Royals. 
^16	  I take this point to apply even to absences: either absences are causes and thus exist, or else they do not exist and so are not causes. I prefer the former view, but will not try to defend it here.
^17	  Papineau (2001: 11).
^18	  See Papineau (2002: 19), where it is made explicit that the specific physicalist conclusion Papineau is arguing for is that Kimian mental events are identical with physical events.
^19	  See for instance Wright (2003) and (2004), Davies (2004), McLaughlin (2003), Pryor (2004), Silins (2005), and Tucker (2010).
^20	  Wright (2003).
^21	  Cf. Pryor (2004) and Tucker (2010).
^22	  Davidson’s (1970) and (1995) case for (Closure) appears to be a priori. The “pairing problem” discussed by Foster (1991: Ch. 6) and Kim (2005: Ch. 3) also potentially serves as the basis for an a priori defense.
^23	  The second and third premises of the causal argument are supported by armchair considerations. If the argument is to rely on any empirical support, it must be support for its (Closure) premise.
^24	  Melnyk (2003: 289-290).  See also Papineau (2001) and (2002: Ch. 1).
^25	  Goodman (1955) is the classic contemporary discussion of the link. My arguments that follow are especially influenced by Lange (2000).
^26	  Perhaps it also commits you to accepting a certain range of counterfactuals, but we can leave this open.
^27	  Just which counterfactuals you must refrain from accepting will depend on your warranted background beliefs. I happen to know there are bits of copper warmer than my samples, but imagine a subject with the warranted (but false) belief that my samples are the warmest pieces of copper in the world. Such a subject could plausibly justifiably accept the inductive case even while accepting the counterfactual in question, holding that my samples wouldn’t have been conductive had they been warmer. For, by her lights, whether my samples would or wouldn’t have been conductive had they been warmer may well be irrelevant to the question of whether all actual copper is conductive, given her warranted but false view that no actual copper is so warm.
^28	  A related possibility is to propose that being physical is a natural kind while being a non-Champion Royal event is not. But I can only see how this might help if it is supposed in addition that by virtue of being a natural kind, the property of being physical enters into explanatory relations, like lawful relations, while properties that aren’t natural kinds can’t do this. In other words, I can only see how this might help if it involves covertly supposing that (Closure)’s truth is explanatorily overdetermined.
^29	  Sometimes the term “induction” is used broadly, to cover abduction as well as enumerative induction. In that case I concede that (Closure) is “inductively confirmed” by its positive instances, but insist that its positive instances confirm it only by first confirming (P*).
^30	  Chalmers (1996), Jackson (1982).
^31	  See for instance Tye (2009: §2.2), a section entitled “Why Consciousness Cannot be Physical,” which sets out familiar dualist arguments. It is immediately followed by a section (§2.3) entitled “Why Consciousness Must be Physical,” which defends a version of the causal argument.
^32	  Jackson (1982) notably defends epiphenomenalism while Chalmers (1996) at least entertains it.
^33	  Presumably God could know of this act of creation even if unicorns were epiphenomenal or causally redundant, and so what God tells us does not deductively entail ~(U-Closure).
